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The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Cost of Bank Loans 
By Danah Baqais 
 
        In this paper we try to investigate the effect of corporate governance on the cost of 
external debt financing. Using a sample of North American companies from 1990 to 
2006, we find that high corporate governance levels raises a company’s credit rating by 
the agencies leading to an increase in external financing capacity by lowering the cost 
debt. We also put a spotlight on specified corporate governance areas and their effect on 
the cost of bank loans. Our results suggest that banks take into account the risk of poor 
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Chapter 1:  
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance refers to the set of systems, principles and processes by which a 
company is governed. It is well-known that the main goal for a company’s corporate 
governance is to maximize shareholder wealth and to provide protection to all 
stakeholders by the compliance of the best practice principles and regulations. Evaluation 
of corporate governance performance differs based on each company’s specific condition 
but there are some basic guidelines to eliminate potential risks to occur. The importance 
of corporate governance arises from its effects on many different aspects in any 
institution such as firm performance, risk management, and economic growth to name but 
a few. However, what concerns us in this paper is the effect of the quality of corporate 
governance on the cost of bank loans and to what extent. 
 
Bankers are concentrating on how to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower by two 
methods, which are quantitative and qualitative measures. The objective is to be able to 
evaluate the default risk on a future loan and determine the answer of what is the accurate 
number to price a loan for an institutional borrower, as well as non-price terms such as 
covenants and collateral. Therefore, many studies have already detected the relationship 
between the default risk and the cost of debt and came up with results that the higher the 





In this paper we will put a spotlight on the qualitative area, more specifically on how the 
quality of corporate governance affects the cost of loans issued by banks from 1990 to 
2006 using two sets of data. The first one is considered as a way to measure corporate 
governance and it is called the G-Index. The second one covers bank loans at the level of 
individual US firms.  
 
The Governance Index is a measure of the quality of corporate governance by adding up 
one point for each provision regarding the absence or existence of each company’s 
specific provision. It is divided into five areas: Delay (Blank check, Classified Board, 
Special Meeting, and Written Consent), Protection (Compensation Plans, Contracts, 
Golden Parachutes, Indemnification, Liability, and Severance), Voting (Bylaws, Charter, 
Cumulative Voting, Secret Ballot, Supermajority, and Unequal Voting), Other 
(Antigreenmail, Director’s Duties, Fair Price, Pension Parachutes, Poison Pill, and Silver 
Parachutes), and State (Antigreenmail Law, Business Combination Law, Cash-Out Law, 
Director’s Duties Law, Fair Price Law, and Control Share Acquisition Law). The total 
number of provisions is 28, and the index is higher for low corporate governance quality 
and low for high corporate governance quality. The data were collected for around 1500 
large firms during 14 years between1990 to 2004. However, in our model we will 




The second set of data come from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s (LPC) DealScan data, 
which is one of the most reliable, extensive, and historical data sets from 1990 up to 2006 
the year before the noticeable jump on loan prices during the 2007/2008 financial crises.  
To test the relationship between the corporate governance and the debt cost we will use 
panel data analysis that will capture the correlation between corporate governance and 
cost of debt, and whether it is strong or weak correlation. Therefore, the higher the 
correlation the stronger the effect of corporate governance quality on the cost of bank 
loan would be. Creditors to ensure that they will be paid back and in the case of risk they 
in turn raise the cost of debt, which will benefit the banking system and harm the 











2.1 Literature review 
Recently, many research papers have been published regarding the factors that affect the 
cost of debt the most. Strong and effective corporate governance could benefit the 
company by cutting the cost of bank loans down with the governance being the core. 
Examples of good governance include the board of directors and management quality, 
auditing, and information disclosure (Biao et al 2013). 
 
2.2 The Board of directors and management quality  
Fields et al (2012) shows that the higher the board’s quality, independence, and 
experience, the lower the interest rate on bank loan, and less regulation in the non-price 
terms. The same adverse relationship between management quality and the cost of debt is 
shown clearly with no evidence saying that the lower cost of loan because of high 
management quality will lead to more regulation and restriction on non-price terms 
(Mohammad, and Zaman 2013).  
2.3 Information disclosure  
Many papers have provided evidence regarding the effect of corporate timely and 
detailed information disclosure on eliminating the possibility of borrower’s default risk as 
well as the potential of agency conflicts between shareholder and creditors which in turn 
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will reduce the bank cost of loans and raise the credit rating (Partha, 1998). However, 
information disclosure is a very wide research area, so they did just not stop at the 
influence of the required information disclosure on the cost of bank loan. Rather they 
have given results about the role of voluntary information disclosure on the cost of debt 
this is an insignificant and negative relationship.  
2.4 Auditing quality 
An audit quality and its effect on cost of debt the research found that the Big 4 audits, 
who are the four largest auditing and accounting firms for large publicly traded firms in 
the U.S., are associated with a lower cost of debt. Moving from Big 4 to non-Big 4 will 
cause an increase in cost of debt reducing the ability to acquire a bank loan (Biao et al 
2013). Additionally, according to Karjalainen (2011) the firms that made changes on their 
outcomes and opinion about their report, which would lead to lower reporting quality, 
will have a higher interest rate.  
In this research paper we are focusing on the cost of debt as the interest rate on a bank 
loan. The cost of a loan is not limited to the just interest rate. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
it covers other factors including covenant, maturity, and syndication (non-price terms) as 
well as the agency costs that arise from the potential conflict of interest between 
shareholders and creditors. Agency costs are a rich research area, and it has been reported 
that the improvement in corporate governance with higher external financing will lead to 
a decrease in agency costs when the shareholder in a levered firm takes actions that cause 
an unjust wealth transfer from creditors to shareholder (Chae, et al 2009). 
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More generally, the research papers that indicate the relationship between corporate 
governance and cost of bank loan mostly find their results based on one or two factors of 
corporate governance, but not corporate governance as a whole which we will deal with 
in this research paper using G-index which contains the five categories including 28 
















3.1 Corporate governance characteristics 
As noted in Chapter 2 on the literature review, corporate governance has a strong 
influence on the cost of a bank loan. Prior studies have tended to focus on one component 
of corporate governance and its effect on the cost of debt. However, this paper will 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of bank loan. Before 
doing so, we would like to show how the cost of debt is affected by each one of the main 
three attributes of corporate governance namely ownership structure, financial disclosure, 
and board structure (Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al 2006).  
3.2 Ownership structure 
Shareholders, who have an ownership of publicly traded firms, usually have strong 
concerns about their residual claims protection. Governance that monitors management 
practices and limits any profiteering actions protects the rights for all stakeholders 
including creditors and shareholders. However, that is not an easy task to be done by 
management. Shareholders with the power of voting in theory can force management to 
take risky projects where in the case of success will get the entire benefit leaving zero 
extra benefit to bondholders, and in the case of failure, bondholders will bear the loss. As 
a result the ownership structure is very a important component of corporate governance, 
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and is the main cause of wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. 
 
Under the wealth transfer situation, as the percentage of ownership by institutional 
investors increases, the possibility of these investors to use their power increases as well, 
which leads to high likelihood of interest conflicts between stakeholder and in turn a 
negative impact on credit rating.  
The company’s credit rating specially by the Big Three credit rating agencies: Moody’s 
Investors Services, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings, affects the debt cost and the 
studies have proven that the market strongly reacts to downgrades of ratings more than to 
upgrades in pricing for both bonds and stocks. For example, the European Central Bank 
noted that the price reaction to downgrading is not symmetric to upgrading on stock 
returns (Pett, 2013).  
3.3 Financial transparency  
Several finance papers argue that managers deprive wealth from creditors, and they add 
that timely and detailed financial reports have a noticeable effect on reducing debt 
contact costs. Specially, non-price terms such as covenants that restrict dividends 
payment or engage in more debt contracts. Creditors prevent corporations from shifting 
the wealth from them to shareholders and risk from shareholders to bondholders by 
exercising their power and putting some restrictions on capital expenditures, asset sales, 
or dividends payment, and these restrictions are based on financial information 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al 2006). 
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3.4 Board structure 
The board structure plays an important role providing an independent oversight of firm 
performance or actions related to each committee; auditing, compensation, nominating, 
and investment. These committees are segments of the board that their members meet 
separately to deal with some specific functions.  
3.4.1 Board independence 
The independence of the board of directors is a very useful tool in monitoring and control 
of the enterprise actions. Creditors value the independence of board of directors because 
of their strong control on management activities. Therefore protect them from any 
conflict of interest as well as the default risk for the company as a whole. It has been 
proved (see Chapter 2) that board independence is positively related to credit rating, and 
as we noted earlier in this paper that firm credit rating is inversely related to the cost of a 
bank loan. Therefore, board independence should be negatively related to the cost of 
debt. 
3.4.2 Board expertise  
It is logical that board members with long experience and superior knowledge will help to 
predict a better future to the company and eliminate the chance of default. Credit rating 
agencies account for board members expertise and look for the percentage of the board 
members who were on the board of other companies and the reputation for each 
individual on the board. 
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Credit rating agencies give positive points for the board expertise and that will lead to 
lower cost of debt. 
3.4.3 Board size 
Research has shown that the large size board of directors has an effect on raising the 
ability to monitor management team and control their actions because of the large 
number of expertise and knowledgeable board members (Adams and Mehran, 2005; 
Chaganti et al., 1985; Klein, 2002). However, John and Senbet (1998) argue that a large 
number of directors on the board will be costly by the poor communication between 











Chapter4: Methodology  
4.1 Variables and data 
4.1.1 Data 
This paper will capture the effect of company’s corporate governance level on the cost of 
bank loan. We will consider North American companies in our analysis using three sets 
of data; G-index, (LPC) Loan Price Corporation, and Compustat during the period of 16 
years from 1990 up to 2006. We will use the data for this period because the G-index data 
is available from 1990, but we do not want to include the period of the financial crises 
2007\2008 when the cost of bank loans jumped significantly. However, the G-index data 
is up to 2004 and in this paper we will assume that the corporate governance level in 
2006 will be the same as 2004 corporate governance level. 
First, the G-index is a proxy to measure the level of shareholders rights for 1500 large 
firms by adding points for each provision. Every provision gives management the power 
to restrict shareholders rights, such as suing the directors, bylaws, calling private 
meetings, or changing all of them. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of firms with each one 
of corporate governance provisions for eight years from 1990 to 1998 with two years gap 
between every a two results. Table 4.2 presents the corporate governance statistics for the 
same period of time from 1990 to 1998. 
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Table 4.1                               Governance Provisions  
 
Source: Corporate Governance and Equity Prices by Gompers et al (2003) 






Table 4.2                                         The Governance Index. 
 
Source: Corporate Governance and Equity Prices by Gompers et al (2003) 
Note: This table provides summary statistics on the distribution of G, the Governance 
Index, and the sub-indices (Delay, Protection, Other, Voting, and State) over time. 
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Second, in this paper we collect our cost of bank loan data from DealScan database of 
(LPC) Loan Pricing Corporation, which gives detailed data for all US and foreign 
commercial loan. The LCP DealScan database is compiled from the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) corporate financial fillings for both loans and multiple 
loans.  
Third, in order to get the companies’ size we will use the log of total asset from the 
Compustat. Compustat is a database that is published by (S&P) Standard and Poor’s, and 
it gives informative financial data for more than 40 years. 
4.1.2 Variables  
In this paper we are dealing with five variables, four of them are independent; G-index, 
amount, maturity, and size and one is dependent variable; cost of bank loan. The main 
variables of interest are cost of a bank loan, and the G-index. 
4.1.2.1 Cost of bank loan  
Our dependent variable is the cost of a bank loan, which is the important outcome of our 
analysis. Usually, the cost of a bank loan is calculated as the loan spread over LIBOR 
(London Interbank Offered Rate) at the inception of the loan as a way to measure loan 
cost from a bank. The cost of a bank loan is given through DealScan database as “All-in-
Drawn” which is the amount paid by borrowers in basis points over LIBOR. As well as 
the loan spread with any extra annual fee that is paid by the borrower of the loan to the 
bank. We will transform “All-in-drawn” to the logarithm in our analysis, and then 
windsorize it to wlogspreed.  
 19 
4.1.2.2 G-index 
We have briefly mentioned the 24 G-index provisions in the introductory part. However, 
in this section we will discuss G-index provisions in more detail. 
-Antigreenmail: is a provision that prevents the large shareholders to agree to sell their 
stocks back at premium and promise not to exercise their control on the company.  
-Blank Check preferred stock is used as a way of anti-takeover by placing them with 
friendly investors. 
-Business Combination Laws: enforce a legal authorized delay of sum kinds of 
transactions; (asset sales, mergers) between the firm and large shareholders. 
-Bylaw and charter prevent shareholders from amend the corporate governance 
documents. 
-Cash-out Laws prevent small shareholders to sell their stocks to large controlling 
shareholders at a high price. 
-Classified Board when the directors serve different overlapping terms. 
-Compensation Plans determine the amount paid from each agent’s own sales such as 
cash out options or accelerate bonuses. 
-Contract is a way to indemnify the company from specified legal expense and 
judgments from lawsuits. 
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-Control-share Acquisition laws and supermajority are requirements for agreement of 
mergers or other business activities that are above the threshold limit of state law  
-Cumulative Voting gives the shareholders the right to votes that will give minority 
shareholders to vote. 
-Directors’ Duties open directors’ eyes to consider constituencies other than shareholder 
for merger decisions. 
-Fair-Price asks a bidder to pay the highest price to all shareholders during specified 
period of time. 
-Golden Parachutes are agreements that show compensation to senior executives 
whether it is cash or non- cash. 
-Indemnification is used to indemnify directors from some legal expenses by bylaws, 
charter, or both. 
-Liability is a provision that limits directors’ liability to the limit allowed by state law. 
-Pension Parachutes is a provision to protect financing for target acquisition from an 
acquirer who desires to use pension fund surplus cash.  
-Poison Pills: in the case of a hostile takeover, poison pills give their holders special 
rights.  
-Secret Ballot is a special independent third party that used to count proxy votes. 
-Executive Severance 
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-Silver Parachutes they give severance payments for a change in corporate governance 
control. 
-Special meeting to limit any special meetings beyond the limit set by state law. 
-Unequal Voting limits the ability of some shareholders to vote while expand the rights 
for others.  
-Written Consent to limit actions that can be an establishment of thresholds above the 
limit of stated law. 
4.1.2.3 Wlogamt: is the winsorized logarithm loan amount using DealScan database. 
4.1.2.4 Wlogmat: is the windsorized logarithm loan maturity using DealScan database. 
4.1.2.5 Wlogsize: is the winsorized logarithm of company’s total asset using Compustat 
database. 
4.1.2.6 wlognet_profit:  is the windsorized  logarithm of company’s net income 
calculated by simply deducting expenses from revenue using compustat database. 
4.1.2.7 wlogleverage: is the windsorized  logarithm of company’s leverage level using 
compusts database . 
4.1.2.8 wlogQ: is the windsorized  logarithm of company’s total market value divided by 




4.2 The Model  
In this paper we will be using the Panel Data Model because the data that we are using 
are both cross sectional and time series. And it is both long and short Panel data due to 
the large number of accompanies as well as time periods. This test we will distinguish 
which type of Panel data to use.  
Hausman test is used to decide whether a fixed effect should be used or a Random effect 
estimator. If the Hausman test estimator is insignificant we will use the Random effects, 
but if it is significant, this mean that if we use Random effect estimators on the Fixed 
Effect Model, we will get inconsistent results.  
The fixed effect model is used in this paper, which will allow the individual-specific 
effects to be correlated with the regressors  
 Wlogspreed= α+ β1wlogamt + β2 wlogmat+ β3 wlogsize + β4 G-index+ β5 








5.1 Empirical results  
We are using the panel data analysis to study the relationship between the cost of bank 
loans and the corporate governance level by chosen factors described above. First we will 
start with the regression results of the Hausman test. Table 4.3 shows that the p-value of 
Chi Square is very significant indicating that the fixed and random coefficients are 






Second, looking at Table 4.4, it is obvious from the p-values (almost zero) that our results 
are statistically significant, which means that it is most likely that our results are not 
based on random sampling. Additionally, our independent variables have an effect on the 
cost of a bank loan. For example, the coefficient of wlogsize is  -0.4233, which means 
that there is a negative relationship between the wlogspreed and wlogsize, the same logic 





Finally, after testing which type of Panel data analysis to use, we will now focus on our 
main test to prove all the theoretical research above. Running the Fixed Effect test ( see 
Table 4.5 ). We can observe the coefficients of each variable; wlogsize, wlogmat, 
wlogamt, gindex2, wlognet_profit, wlogleverage, and wlogQ.  
First, for the effect of company’s size, loan maturity length, and company’s leverage 
on the cost of bank loans, we got positive coefficents. But both of them are less than 
.1 indicating a weak realtionship between the company size, and loan maturity on 
debt cost. Second, the loan amount variable is influencing the loan spread negatively 
(-.1522), which means as the amount of loan become larger, the cost of borrowing 
will be lower. Additionally, the cost of bank loans is influnced negatively by the net 
profit, but the effect is weak while the Tobin’s q ratio has a strong negative effect on 
the cost of debt. In other words, because the Tobin’s q is less than one, which means 
when the company’s shares are undervalued, that will make borrowing more 
expensive. Most importantly, the G-index variable and its effect on the cost of debt, 
from the G-index coeffecent of .064 we understand that when a company has a 
lower corporate governance level it will get higher points in the G-index which in 
turn will cause a higher cost of a bank loan.  
Finally, we should look at two important points the P-value, and Rho. All p-values 
are statisticaly significant showing that our results are not based on random 
sampling. Rho at the end of the table, which is the percent of the variation that is 
explained by individual specific effects, in our test is relatively high indicating that it 










 6.1. Conclusion  
The purpose of our study is to investigate the effect of a company’s corporate governance 
on the cost of bank loans using a sample of North American companies for the period 
from 1990 to 2006. This paper also focuses on how the individual variables within 
specified areas of corporate governance influence the cost of external debt financing 
including the effect of board of directors structure, ownership structure, and information 
disclosure/transparency. To be specific, will those individually or collectively increase 
the firm rating by the credit rating agencies knowing that they respond to downgrading 
activities more than any improvements.  
Our results suggest that creditors do pay attention to a company’s credit rating and more 
importantly that an increase in corporate governance level will lead to a lower G-index, 
which in turn will reduce the cost of bank loans. However, pricing a debt contract in our 
test does not depend only on the governance level, but also a company’s other variables 
including leverage, net profitability, Tobin’s Q, and size as well as some variables related 
to the debt its size, and maturity.  
It is hoped that this paper is a step forward towards understanding the importance of 
corporate governance on pricing external debt financing and how the evaluation of the 
governance level will affect a company’s financial conditions. 
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